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CAN GENERIC PRODUCTS BE DISPARAGED? THE "OF
AND CONCERNING" REQUIREMENT AFTER ALAR AND
THE NEW CROP OF AGRICULTURAL
DISPARAGEMENT STATUTES*
Eric M. Stahl
Abstract: Under the group libel principle, a statement broadly critical of a large group
generally cannot give rise to a defamation claim; it is said that such a statement does not refer
to, or is not of and concerning, any particular individual. This Comment addresses the extent
to which the "of and concerning" requirement and group libel principle apply to claims of
product disparagement, a tort similar to defamation but encompassing pecuniary injury, as
opposed to damage to reputation, resulting from false statements. In particular, this Comment
examines whether speech generally critical of a generic product can give rise to
disparagement liability. Recent statutes provide for such generic disparagement claims by
agricultural producers, and one court, in the litigation resulting from the Alar controversy, has
held the group libel rule does not bar such claims. This Comment concludes that, in most
circumstances, the "of and concerning" requirement cannot be satisfied without a specific
reference to the allegedly disparaged product and that generic disparagement claims usually
should be barred, for both policy and constitutional reasons.
A report, published nationwide, states that a procedure commonly
used to treat navel oranges renders the fruit unsafe to eat. As a result of
the report, sales of all oranges plummet; scores of orange growers lose
their livelihood. The report, which did not identify any particular grower,
is later proven false. Should the report's publisher be liable for the navel-
orange growers' losses? What about losses to growers of other varieties
of oranges, other citrus fruits, or other farm products, which were not
mentioned in the report but which suffered declining sales in the report's
wake?
Publishing, with the requisite level of fault, a false statement that
injures another's economic interests constitutes the tort of
disparagement.' Since 1981,2 courts have stated that, generally, the
constitutional principles that limit defamation claims also apply to claims
* Editor's note: A version of this Comment was recognized as the national winner of the 1996
Stephen G. Thompson Memorial Writing Competition in communications law.
1. Disparagement is similar in many respects to defamation, but the two torts are distinct and
protect different interests. See infra part 1.
2. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270-71 (D. Mass.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1 st Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 485
(1984).
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of disparagement.3 However, while a defamatory statement must refer
specifically to, or be "of and concerning," the plaintiff,4 few courts have
had occasion to apply this element to product disparagement claims.
Those that have differ sharply over the specificity with which the
disparaging statement must identify the plaintiff's property--that is,
whether the statement must refer directly to the particular plaintiff's
product,6 or whether it is enough that the plaintiff has an economic
interest in the generic type of product the defendant disparaged.7
The role of the "of and concerning" requirement in disparagement
cases is likely to receive growing attention. A number of states recently
have passed "agricultural disparagement" laws that provide agricultural
producers with causes of action for statements that generally disparage
the type of food product they grow, even if the statements make no
specific reference to a plaintiff's ovm product.9 These laws raise the issue
of whether a strict "of and concerning" element is constitutionally
required in disparagement claims.
This Comment addresses the conflict posed by "generic
disparagement" claims between the interests of producers of generic
products, who can be damaged by speech that does not refer to any
specific individual or product, and the free-speech interests of the public
in matters such as food safety. Part I discusses the extent to which the "of
and concerning" element and other First Amendment principles of
defamation law have been applied to the tort of disparagement. Part II
summarizes the litigation resulting from the Alar controversy, in which a
report critical of a chemical widely used on apples was held to be of and
concerning all apples and apple growers, and criticizes the district court's
approach to generic disparagement. Part III analyzes the recent
3. For example, in Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 126S-77, the district court required the plaintiff to show
the defendant acted with the same heightened degree of fault, actual malice, as would have been
required had the claim been defamation rather than disparagement.
4. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558, 564 cmt. g (1977).
5. The required specificity is well-settled in defamation law: Under "group libel" theory, a
statement that refers generally to a large class, without identifying an individual, cannot give rise to
an individual defamation claim. See infra part I.C.
6. See, e.g., Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934
(1988).
7. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that report on
cancer risk posed by Alar, then a chemical widely used on apples, was of and concerning all apples).
The case is discussed infra part 11.
8. See Bruce E.H. Johnson & Susanna M. Lowy, Does Life Exist on Mars? Litigating Falsity in a
Non- "Ofand Concerning" World, 12 Comm. Law. 1, 20-23 (1994).
9. See infra part III.
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agricultural disparagement laws and concludes that the statutes'
allowance of a finding of liability without any "of and concerning"
showing is unconstitutional. Finally, part IV argues that generic
disparagement claims are inconsistent with the constitutional protection
of free speech in all but a narrow set of circumstances and offers a
framework for identifying those circumstances.
I. THE "OF AND CONCERNING" REQUIREMENT IN
DEFAMATION AND DISPARAGEMENT
A. Common-Law and Constitutional Elements of Disparagement
Although defamation and disparagement" both involve injury
resulting from the publication of false statements, they developed as
distinct torts." The tort of disparagement provides a remedy for
economic losses resulting from criticism of a plaintiff's business,
product, or other property, whereas defamation law protects a plaintiffs
interest in personal reputation. 2
The elements of disparagement are: (1) publication (2) with some
degree of fault (3) of a false statement (4) that is harmful to the plaintiff s
interests and (5) that results in pecuniary loss to the plaintiff. 3 The
10. Some commentators classify injury to property interests resulting from false statements as the
general tort of injurious falsehood. When the quality of the plaintiffs goods is disparaged, the
particular form of injurious falsehood is known as slander of goods, trade libel, or product
disparagement; when the false statement relates to ownership, the particular tort is slander of title.
See Restatement (Second) ofTorts ch. 28, Injurious Falsehood (Including Slander of Title and Trade
Libel) (1977); 2 F. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 6.1, at 262 (2d ed. 1986); W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 128, at 962-63 (5th ed. 1984).
11. Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 254-55 (Ct. App. 1985);
Keeton et al., supra note 10, § 128, at 962.
For discussions of the historic relationship between the two torts, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Free
Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair
Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 903, 907-23
(1989); Lisa Magee Arent, Note, A Matter of "'Governing' Importance". Providing Business
Defamation and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First Amendment Protection, 67 Ind. L.J.
441,446-50 (1992).
12. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 623A cmt. g (1977).
13. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A (1977). At common law, the degree of fault was
satisfied if the defendant published negligently in a manner that would deter a potential purchaser, or
with "ill will" toward the plaintiff or with intent to harm the plaintiff economically. Restatement of
Torts § 624 (1938). The Restatement (Second) definition requires both intent to injure and intent to
falsify and notes that if constitutional developments in defamation law apply to disparagement, the
fault element requires that: (I) the publisher intends to harm the plaintiffs pecuniary interests or
recognizes or should recognize such harm is likely; and (2) the statement be published with
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special damages must be proven, but at common law there was no
explicit requirement, as there was in defamation claims, that the
challenged statement be of and concerning the plaintiff or its property. 4
Thus, producers of an agricultural product who could show lost sales
resulting from a published, maliciously false statement about that type of
crop could claim disparagement.' 5
However, courts increasingly have viewed disparagement in light of
the same First Amendment protections 6  that led to the
constitutionalization of defamation law with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.7 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court suggested the "of and
concerning" element of a defamation claim had a constitutional basis,
holding it unconstitutional to construe "an otherwise impersonal attack
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 623A caveat and cmt. d (1977). See also Harper et al., supra note 10, § 6 1, at 265; Rawn H.
Reinhard, Note, The Tort of Disparagement and the Developing First Amendment, 1987 Duke L.J.
727, 727-28,749-51(1987).
14. There are two ways to view this difference between disparagement and defamation. One is
that an "of and concerning" element is redundant in disparagement because of the tort's other
elements. Some argue the actual injury requirement for disparagement "serves to screen out product
disparagement actions based on publications which the public did not understand to be 'of and
concerning' plaintiffs product." Appellants' Reply Brief at 7, Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d
816 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35963), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-
1372). It could also be argued the requirement that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff
likewise protects against disparagement claims that are not of and concerning thu plaintiff. See Blatty
v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1187 (Cal. 1986) (Grodin, J., concuring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
The other view is that disparagement's additional elements did not serve to supplant an "of and
concerning" requirement but simply reflected the common-law understanding that disparagement
should be more difficult to prove than defamation because economic interests were less valued than
personal interests in reputation. Prior to the constitutionalization of defamation law, defamation
plaintiffs also did not have to prove actual damages in most cases and had the firther advantages of a
presumption that the challenged statement was false and of strict liability a.,; to the defendant's
knowledge of falsity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A cmt. g (1977); Reir hard, supra note 13,
at 730-32.
15. The plaintiffs would have to show other reasonably likely causes were not to blame for their
injuries. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633 crnt. h (1977) suggests a plaintiff cannot show the
injury resulted from the disparaging statement if the lost sales could be attributed to a general decline
in the market. However, the Restatement does not appear to address the generic disparagement
problem--that is, what happens when the general decline in the market is itself attributable to a
disparaging statement.
16. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A caveat and introductory cmt, (1977); Reinhard,
supra note 13, at 746-58; infra note 30 and accompanying text.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The case is perhaps known best for its "actual malice" holding: that, to
provide speech critical of government with the "breathing space" necessary to promote the "robust
and wide-open" public debate envisioned by the First Amendment, id. at 270-72, public officials
claiming defamation must prove the defendant acted with "actual malice-tha is, with knowledge
[the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," id. at 279-80.
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on governmental operations" as defaming the official responsible for
those operations. 8 The Court later explicitly stated that this "of and
concerning" requirement grew directly from the First Amendment. 9
The Supreme Court has never reached the question of whether the
constitutional limits on defamation apply equally to disparagement. In
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, lnc.,20 however, the
Court accepted, without ruling on, a district court holding,' that
Sullivan's actual malice rule' applied to disparagement claims.' Since
Bose, numerous courts 4 and commentators 25 substantially have agreed
that, because of the similarities between the two torts, disparagement
claims "are subject to the same first amendment requirements that govern
actions for defamation., 26
B. "Of and Concerning" Analysis in Disparagement Claims
It would seem to follow that because the First Amendment requires
the "of and concerning" element in defamation actions, the element
therefore would be required in disparagement claims as well. However,
only the California Supreme Court has reached this conclusion explicitly.
In Blatty v. New York Times Co.,27 the court concluded that the
constitutional limitations on defamation law, including the "of and
concerning" requirement, "are not peculiar to [defamation] actions but
apply to all claims whose gravamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of
a statement. ' 28 The court explained that "it is immaterial for First
18. Id. at 292.
19. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1966).
20. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
21. 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270-71 (D. Mass. 1981).
22. See supra note 17.
23. 466 U.S. at 513.
24. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F. Supp. 928, 933 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Blatty v.
New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988); cases cited
infra note 30.
25. See, e.g., Arent, supra note 11, at 457 (arguing "business defamation and product
disparagement should be treated as the same tort" and subject to maximum First Amendment
protection); Langvardt, supra note 11, at 937-38 (arguing the torts merit similar, though not
identical, constitutional treatment).
26. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961
(1991).
27. 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986) (holding that newspaper's best-sellers list which omitted author did
not disparage him because list did not name him, and thus was not of and concerning him), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988).
28. Id. at 1182.
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Amendment purposes whether the statement in question relates to the
plaintiff himself or merely to his property broadly defined."29
Blatty's unequivocal application of defamation rules to disparagement
cases is alluring for its predictability. Most other "constitutionalized"
disparagement cases, however, have involved not the "of and
concerning" element but rather one of the other constitutional limitations
on defamation.3" Given the scant precedent,3 ' any argument that the "of
and concerning" element is constitutionally required in -disparagement
claims should also rest on a showing that the ends the element serves in
defamation law also must be served in disparagement claims. As will be
shown,32 this is the case, at least when the claim involves a. large number
of plaintiffs.
C. The Group Libel Principle and Its Implications for Disparagement
"Of and concerning" questions arise when the defamatory or
disparaging statement does not refer explicitly to the plaintiff or, perhaps,
to anyone in particular. To be of and concerning a plaintiff, a statement
need not mention that plaintiff by name; it is enough that the statement's
recipient reasonably understands that it refers to the plaintiff.33
When the statement refers to a large group, however, an individual
cannot claim to be defamed absent evidence that the statement applied to
29. Id. at 1183.
30. See, e.g., Unelko, 912 F.2d 1049 (holding that limits on defamation liability for statements of
opinion and on matters of public concern also limit liability for disparaging statements); Quantum
Elecs. Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753, 763 n.12 (D.R.I. 1995)
(stating that limits on defamation liability for statements about public figures also limit
disparagement liability and that defamation -ault standard-actual malic&-would apply to
disparagement claim); Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Port de Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358, 370 (D. Mass
1985) (suggesting "of and concerning" element is constitutionally required in disparagement claims,
but relying primarily on "public figure" and "opinion" doctrines of defamation law to hold that
chemical supplier's statement that its product was not useful ingredient in motor-oil additives did not
disparage manufacturer of additive containing the ingredient), aff'd, 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987); A
& B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283,
1294 (Ohio 1995) (applying actual malice standard to disparagement claim); Dairy Stores, Inc. v.
Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220, 226 (N.J. 1986) (holding that defamation defenses and
privileges apply to disparagement claims).
31. It does not appear that any cases have failed to apply the "of and concerning" element to
disparagement claims. Rather, the dearth of cases directly on point may indicate simply that in most
disparagement actions it is obvious whom the statement was "of and concerning." Also, it shows that
plaintiffs plead defamation instead of disparagement "to avoid the near impossible burden of proving
special damages." Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404,409 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
32. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
33. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558, § 564 cmts. a, b, d, g (1977).
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the individual in particular.34 This rule, known as the group libel
principle, means that the "of and concerning" element generally cannot
be satisfied where a defamatory statement targets a sufficiently large
class. Recovery usually has been limited to statements involving groups
of twenty-five or fewer.35
The group libel principle has a constitutional rationale that is equally
applicable to disparagement. The doctrine "was designed to encourage
frank discussions of matters of public concern under the First
Amendment guarantees," favoring the public's right to know over
"incidental and occasional injury to the individual resulting from the
defamation of large groups. ' 36 One court has stated that allowing
individuals to claim defamation from statements directed at large groups
could invite unwarranted lawsuits and stifle discussion of issues or
groups "in the public eye," a prospect that the court held was
unacceptably in conflict with the First Amendment. 37 The court cited an
early case, which noted:
It is far better for the public welfare that some occasional
consequential injury to an individual arising from general censure
of his profession, his party, or his sect should go without remedy
than that free discussion on the great questions of politics, or
morals, or faith should be checked by the dread of embittered and
boundless litigation.38
Boundless litigation resulting from general speech about products has
the same potential to stifle discussion of matters of great public
34. To prevail in a group libel claim, the plaintiff must prove "(a) the group or class is so small
that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or (b) the circumstances of
publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A (1977).
35. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A cmt. b (1977); Keeton et al., supra note 10, § 11, at
784. For examples of group libel cases, see Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226 (10th
Cir. 1987) (holding that class of 955 dog breeders could not claim defamation from article about
inhumane conditions at certain unnamed puppy farms); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (holding that group of 25 salesmen was small enough to withstand motion to
dismiss defamation claim, whereas their co-workers, a class of 382 saleswomen, were precluded by
group libel principle from pursuing defamation claim against same author).
36. Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (App. Div. 1981); accord Gintert
v. Howard Publications, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829, 834-39 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Barger v. Playboy Enters.,
564 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff d, 732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853
(1984); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (W.D.
Mich. 1980), aff'd, 665 F.2d I 10 (6th Cir. 1981).
37. Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 485 F. Supp. at 900.
38. Ryckman v. Delevan, 25 Wend. 186, 198-99 (N.Y. 1840), quoted in Michigan United
Conservation Clubs, 485 F. Supp. at 900.
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importance. 9 In this respect, the "of and concerning" limitation that
restricts group libel claims also is a constitutional limit on generic
disparagement claims.40
The group libel rule has led one court to conclude that "an entire
industry ... cannot sue on grounds of defamation."'" Prior to the Alar
litigation," an entire industry had never sought recovery on
disparagement grounds. A few courts have applied the "of and
concerning" requirement in situations analogous to "generic
disparagement."43 These cases, however, did not explicitly recognize that
the injuries complained of were pecuniary, not personal, and therefore
failed to address whether there was any need to treat disparagement
differently from defamation. Thus, they did not squarely address the
conflict raised by generic disparagement claims--the collision between
the economic interests protected by disparagement law and the free-
speech interests protected by the "of and concerning" requirement. The
remainder of this Comment analyzes various attemp:s to address
disparagement claims in which the referents of the disparaging statement
are numerous and indistinguishable.
II. AUVIL V CBS "60 MINUTES": CLAIMING GENEIC
DISPARAGEMENT OF APPLES
In the only true generic disparagement case that has been reported,
involving the litigation resulting fiom the Alar controversy, a federal
district court concluded that the "of and concerning" requirement would
not bar each member of a large group of producers of a generic product
39. See generally Arent, supra note 11, at 463-68 (supporting the value or speech critical of
products and business).
40. See Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, Slander and Related Problems 646-47 (2d ed.
1994); Brief Amici Curiae of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., at 15, Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d
816 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-35963), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-
1372).
41. Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D.N.J. 1974), af'd, 513 F.2d 625
(3d Cir. 1975).
42. See infra part II.
43. See, e.g., Mario's Enters. v. Morton-Norwich Prod., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1308 (W.D. Ky. 1980)
(holding that commercial stating "Mario's meatballs" caused indigestion did not refer to plaintiff's
restaurant because the statement just as easily could have been about any of 391 restaurants with the
same name); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding that general criticism of health food boom not enough to sustain clams by health food
stores and industry group); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Bowling Green, Inc. v. Sanders, 563 S.W.2d
8 (Ky. 1978) (holding that criticism of national chain's food referred to group too large for local
outlet to claim statement defamed it).
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from claiming disparagement by a false allegation about the product
generally.
A. The Alar Broadcast and the Resulting Disparagement Claim
In 1989, the CBS newsmagazine 60 Minutes broadcast a segment on
Alar,44 a chemical growth regulator sprayed on apples. Based largely on a
report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the segment
described health concerns-particularly the cancer risk to children-
associated with the chemical's use on apples, and the slow government
response to the problem.45 The segment opened with a shot of a Red
Delicious apple emblazoned with a skull and crossbones. 46 Apple
growers were not identified in any meaningful way.47 Following the
broadcast, the apple market went into a temporary, though severe,
tailspin: Sales and prices plummeted, and the industry lost millions of
dollars.48
In response, eleven Washington apple growers, representing a self-
styled class of 4700 growers in the state, sued CBS and NRDC for
product disparagement. The network moved for dismissal or summary
judgment on the grounds that the broadcast was not of and concerning
any individual grower or the plaintiffs as a group. In Auvil v. CBS "60
Minutes" (Auvil ),49 the district court denied the motion, concluding it
was sufficient for a disparagement claim that the telecast was "'of and
concerning' all apples."5 In a separate order relating to the earlier NRDC
report, Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes" (Auvil 11), ' the court granted
summary judgment to NRDC, reasoning that its written report was not
about "apples per se" but about the cancer risk posed to children by Alar
and other chemicals, and thus was not of and concerning the plaintiffs. 2
Fifteen months later, after protracted discovery,53 the court granted
44. Afar is the trade name for damninozide. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F. Supp. 928, 930
(E.D. Wash. 1992).
45. For a transcript of the broadcast, see id. at 937-41.
46. Id. at 930 n.2.
47. Id. at 933.
48. Id. at 930-31.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 935.
51. 800 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
52. Id. at 943-44.
53. For an account of the discovery, see Johnson & Lowy, supra note 8, at 21-22.
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CBS's second motion for summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs could
not establish that the broadcast was false.54
The court of appeals affirmed that judgment but declined to decide
whether the "of and concerning" requirement applies to product
disparagement law. 5 The district court's approach therefore warrants
analysis, because it stands as authority for future generic disparagement
cases.
B. Auvil Is "Of and Concerning"Analysis
The district court did recognize that the constitutional limits on
defamation apply to disparagement claims.56 In particular, the court
acknowledged that in disparagement cases, the "of and concerning"
requirement is a constitutional threshold, requiring the plaintiff to show
"the offending language pertains directly to a particular individual or
product whose identity can be ascertained from the text (and context) of
the publication.
However, the court reasoned, it does not follow that the "of and
concerning" element should be applied to group disparagement in the
identical manner that it is applied to group defamation. The court stated
that "[t]he individual/group dichotomy is not meaningful when
disparagement is at issue," at least not when the identity of the product
targeted by the communication is clear. 8 Because the 60 Minutes
broadcast suggested that consumers could not tell which apples had been
treated with Alar, the broadcast was "'of and concerning' all apples" and
identified "every apple grower in the country."59
While the group libel doctrine clearly would bar such a broad class
from suing for defamation,6" the court in Auvil I declined to apply the
doctrine to the Alar claim, holding that none of the rationales supporting
the group libel principle was present.6 In support of this conclusion, the
court identified two policies underlying group libel. The first it termed
54. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 836 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wash. 1993), affd, 67? F.3d 816 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-1372).
55. 67 F.3d at 819 n.4.
56. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes" (Auvil 1), 800 F. Supp. 928, 937 (E.D. Wash. 1,992).
57. Id. at 933.
58. Id. at 934.
59. Id. at 935.
60. See supra part I.C.
61. Auvill, 800 F. Supp. at 936.
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"dilution": If a class is sufficiently large, no individual member is likely
to suffer meaningful injury to his or her personal reputation from a
defamatory statement. In contrast, in a disparagement claim, the court
reasoned, the economic damage-the harm which the tort inflicts on each
plaintiff-is real and not diluted; it "is merely distributed among a larger
universe."62 The second theory the court described is "identification": A
defamatory statement about a large group is unlikely to be taken as
identifying any particular individual. In the Auvil I disparagement claim,
however, the court held it irrelevant that no individual producer was
identified in the CBS broadcast because, in identifying all apples, the
broadcast sufficiently identified each grower's product.63
C. Flaws in Auvil I's "Of and Concerning" Holding
Auvil I properly recognizes that the "of and concerning" element is
required in disparagement claims, but its conclusion that the 60 Minutes
broadcast was of and concerning all apples and apple growers is
incorrect. The court's analysis is flawed in two respects. First, in finding
actionable a general statement about a generic product, the court
permitted the very type of group claim that the "identification"
limitation, as a matter of policy, is supposed to prevent. Second, the court
failed to recognize that the group libel principle has a constitutional basis
in addition to its policy-based rationales.
1. Auvil I Ignores Prudential Limits on Liability for Speech About
Large Groups
The "identification" theory on which the group libel principle partly
rests is a policy-based bar on actions resulting from "an impersonal
reproach of an indeterminate class."' Yet the 60 Minutes broadcast was
impersonal-it identified no particular apple or apple grower-and the
Auvil I court itself suggested that liability might extend to an
indeterminate class, namely "every apple grower in the country."65
Therefore, the only way that the court can claim to be acting consistently
with the identification rationale of the group libel principle is by
asserting that it views a general statement about "apples" to be
sufficiently specific to identify all apples, the "individual/group
62. Id. at 935-36.
63. Id. at 936.
64. Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788-90 (App. Div. 1981).
65. Auvill, 800 F. Supp. at 935.
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dichotomy ' 6  notwithstanding. This contradicts what the court itself
recognized is a policy against allowing liability for statements that do not
identify any individual (or, in the disparagement context, any individual
product).
By construing a general statement about a product to be of and
concerning each unit or classification of that product, Auvil I
demonstrates precisely why a more specific reference shoufLd be required.
In concluding that the 60 Minutes broadcast, which was about the risks
posed by a chemical used on many apples, identified "al.1 apples," the
court relied on analysis that is as much chemical as legal. The broadcast
targeted Alar, which the court noted physically merges with fruit when
applied; thus, the court concluded, -the broadcast was of and concerning
apples and therefore, by derivation, apple growers.67 Stich attenuated
reasoning has no logical limit. It means that the broadcast was of and
concerning even those apples grown without Alar, because the broadcast
stated that consumers could not be certain whether arty apple they
purchased was Alar-free.68 Following this logic, if in the wake of the
broadcast consumers had misperceived the danger and turned en masse
toward organic produce, CBS would be liable not only to apple growers
but to producers of all crops grown with chemicals. Requiring plaintiffs
to demonstrate that a disparaging statement specifically identifies them
serves as a prudential check on what otherwise could be limitless
liability.
2. Auvil I Ignores Constitutional Limits on Liability for Speech About
Large Groups
The second flaw in the Auvil I analysis is that it ignores the
constitutional basis for the group libel doctrine.69 Even if Auvil I is
correct that applying group libel concepts to disparagement is
"tantamount to counseling potential disparagors that they are home free
if only they succeed in wreaking damage on a sufficient number of
manufacturers, 70 the court overlooked the effect of the alternative.
Without some effective limit on group disparagement claims, valuable
speech on issues such as product safety will be stifled as journalists,
66. Id. at 934.
67. Id. at 933-34.
68. Id. at 935.
69. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
70. AuvilI, 800 F. Supp. at 936.
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scientists,7 and others worry about being sued, not just by the actual
subjects of their criticism, but by trade associations72 and entire
industries. The "of and concerning" requirement serves as a reliable
guide, based on established constitutional principles, in helping courts
determine how far to extend liability for disparaging speech.
Without such a guide, courts may rely on less credible means, such as
the content of the speech itself, in deciding where to draw the line. The
Auvil decisions demonstrate this danger. It is revealing that although the
60 Minutes broadcast relied on data contained in the NRDC report,73 the
district court held the broadcast was of and concerning the apple
growers74 while the NRDC report was not.75 The court in Auvil I noted
that the NRDC report was highly technical, full of "two dollar words";76
nowhere did it depict an apple "emblazoned with a skull and
crossbones," as did 60 Minutes.78 A consumer's reaction to the report,
the court stated, might be that "the use of pesticides is a topic responsible
officials should be thinking about."'7 9 It is impossible to read Auvil I and
Auvil I1 together without concluding that the court distinguished between
the two for "of and concerning" purposes in part because the broadcast
was specific and alarming, while the NRDC report was broad, dry, and
difficult to understand."0 This amounts to faulting 60 Minutes for doing
exactly what journalists are supposed to do: get to the point as saliently
and concisely as possible. If Alar was indeed a health danger, it is
preferable that consumers be startled into a boycott than lulled into
passing thoughts that "someone really ought to do something."
71. See Michael Kent Curtis, Monkey Trials: Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of
Dissent, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 507, 537-38 (1995) (arguing that permitting liability for
disparagement claims such as that made in the Alar litigation "supports an industry orthodoxy" and
distorts scientific dialogue).
72. The National Agricultural Chemicals Association paid much of the Auvil plaintiffs' legal
expenses. Alar, Pesticide & Toxic Chem. News, Sept. 16, 1992, available in Westlaw, PTCHEMN,
1992 WL 2684949. Some of the new agricultural disparagement statutes provide causes of action for
trade associations. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113A (Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
865.065(3)(a) (West 1994).
73. Auvil 1, 800 F. Supp. at 930.
74. Id.
75. Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes" (Auvil 1), 800 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
76. Id. at 942, 944.
77. Id.
78. Auvil 1, 800 F. Supp. at 930 n.2.
79. Auvil 1l, 800 F. Supp. at 944.
80. The court acknowledged in Auvil H that "[it is not the function of the judiciary to grade the
social or artistic merits of speech," yet it noted the technical quality of the NRDC report,
condemning by comparison the 60 Minutes broadcast. Id. at 942.
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III. THE NEW CROP OF AGRICULTURAL DISPARAGEMENT
STATUTES
A. The Statutes: Permitting Liability for Generic Disparagement
Preventing such an alarmed consumer response in the future is
precisely what supporters of recent agricultural disparagement legislation
hope to achieve.8' Passed in the wake of the Alar controversy 82 to protect
agriculture,83 these statutes generally provide a cause of action for any
producer of a farm product who is injured by disparaging information
about that product.
Numerous states have adopted 4  or considered 5  agricultural
disparagement statutes. In no reported case has any cause of action
provided by an agricultural disparagement statute been asserted. The new
laws, however, have attracted widespread media attention-much of it
ridicule over what has been termed "veggie-hate" legislation. 86 Other
commentators have expressed concern over the laws' potential to deter or
81. See, e.g., Michael Paulson, Belittling Farm Crops Could Cost Big Bucl Under Senate Bill,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 28, 1994, at Al (quoting Washington State Food Processors Council
spokesperson as saying adoption of an agricultural disparagement bill by the Wa.;hington Legislature
would "send a big message to the people that start these things .... I would hope this would have a
chilling effect on the sometimes very irresponsible journalism and reporting.").
82. The first of these bills was adopted in 1991. 1991 La. Acts 972 (codified as La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 3:4501-4504 (West Supp. 1995)).
83. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 3010 (West Supp. 1996) ("The Legislature hereby finds ...
it is beneficial to the citizens of this state to protect the vitality of the agricltural economy by
providing a legal cause of action for producers.., to recover damages for the disparagement of any
perishable agricultural food product.").
84. Ala. Code §§ 6-5-620 to -625 (Supp. 1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113 (Supp. 1995); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-31-101 to -104 (West Supp. 1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 865.065 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1996); Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 (Supp. 1995); Idaho Code §§ 6-2001 to -2003 (Supp.
1995); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 3:4501-4504 (West Supp. 1996); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 69-1-251 to -
257 (Supp. 1995); H.B. 352, 121st Gen. Assembly (Ohio 1996) (enacted Feb. 7, 1996; to be codified
as Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.81); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, §§ 3010-3012 (West Supp. 1996); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. §§ 20-IOA-I to -4 (1995); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 96.001-.004
(West 1996).
85. Agricultural disparagement bills that have been considered but not adopted include H.B. 1098,
54th Leg. (Wash. 1995); A.B. 558 (Cal. 1995); S.B. 311, 136th Gen. Assembly (Del. 1992); S.B.
234, 89th Gen. Assembly (I11. 1995); H.F. 106, 76th Gen. Assembly (Iowa 199.5); H.B. 949, 179th
Gen. Assembly (Pa. 1995); S.B. 160 (S.C. 1995).
86. See, e.g., Gary Stein, Legislators Prove They Are Bananas, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale,
Fla.), Mar. 28, 1994, at I B ("And I can just see the conversation in prison. 'What are you in for?'
'Triple axe murder. How about you?' 'I referred to sweet potatoes as "nauseating junk." I'm a repeat
offender."').
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punish speech critical of food products, particularly news reporting on
food safety."
Most of the recent statutes alter the common-law elements of
disparagement88 in several ways favorable to plaintiffs and fail to apply
the limitations constitutionally required in defamation claims.89 By
omitting an explicit requirement that a false statement be of and
concerning the plaintiff, all but one9° of the agricultural disparagement
laws permit broad, Auvil-type generic disparagement claims. Growers-
and, in some states, sellers,9 shippers,92 trade associations,93 or anyone in
"the entire chain from grower to consumer" 94 -can recover for damages
87. See, e.g., Johnson & Lowy, supra note 8, at 22; Andrew Cohen, "Veggie Hate Laws" Appear
Rotten to Core, Rocky Mountain News (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 10, 1995, at 6A.
88. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See generally House Bill 593; Product
Disparagement, Op. Idaho Att'y Gen. (unpublished opinion dated Feb. 28, 1992, on file with the
Washington Law Review) (analyzing a disparagement bill resembling those adopted in other states
and declaring much of it unconstitutional).
89. For example, some of the statutes permit liability with a lesser fault showing than was
required either at common law or under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and
its progeny. See Johnson & Lowy, supra note 8, at 22; see, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:4502(1)
(West Supp. 1996) (a false statement is actionable if "the disseminator knows or should have
known" of the falsity); Ala. Code §§ 6-5-621(1), -623 (Supp. 1994) (making agricultural
disparagement a strict liability tort by declaring "[i]t is no defense ... that the actor did not intend, or
was unaware of, the act charged").
Also, most of the statutes presume false any information not based on "reliable, scientific facts," or
some similar formulation; defendants may be required to prove the truth of their statements by
offering-and convincing a factfinder of the "reliability" of--the scientific basis for their assertions.
See, e.g., Fla. Stat Ann. § 865.065(2)(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
Furthermore, all but the Idaho and Colorado statutes define the tort not as publishing a false
"statement," but as "dissemination" of false "information." This could make expression of scientific
theories actionable. See Op. Idaho Att'y Gen., supra note 88, at 4, 8. Some commentators contend
such scientific expression is entitled to the same protection as political speech. Curtis, supra note 71,
at 531-34, argues that complex criticism-including the hypothesis that Alar is carcinogenic-
deserves heightened protection because such speech, even if proven false, may still be valuable in
advancing scientific or political understanding. See also Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims
and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43
Vand. L. Rev. 1433, 1443 (1990).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 865.065(3)(b) and S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 20-10A-3 (1995) also depart from
common-law disparagement by providing for automatic punitive damages in certain cases.
90. The exception is Idaho Code §§ 6-2001 to -2003 (Supp. 1995). See infra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text.
91. Ala. Code § 6-5-622 (Supp. 1994).
92. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113A (Supp. 1995).
93. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113A; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 865.065(3)(a); H.B. 352, 121st Gen.
Assembly (Ohio 1996) (enacted Feb. 7, 1996; to be codified as Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.81).
94. Ga. Code. Ann. § 2-16-2(3) (Supp. 1995). Cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 35-31-104(b) (West
Supp. 1995) (providing for restitution to "any victim" of a knowingly false statement made about a
food product).
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caused by disparaging information disseminated about a food product,
with no requirement that the information identify the plaintiffs or their
specific output.9"
B. Constitutional Questions Raised by the Statutes' Lack ofAny "Of
and Concerning" Requirement
The constitutionality of the new statutes has not yet been tested.96 A
claim under one of the new agricultural disparagement statutes, however,
should for a number of reasons 97 reveal the laws to be inconsistent with
the constitutional protections of free speech that have developed over the
last three decades.98 The absence of an "of and concerning" requirement
in itself makes the statutes vulnerable to a constitutional ch.allenge for the
same reason group libel claims are constitutionally barred: to protect free
discourse on matters of public concern."
To illustrate, consider the hypothetical in the introduction to this
Comment. Under most of the statutes, a false report that disparages navel
oranges and leads to a general decline in all agricultural sales could give
rise to a claim by all navel orange growers. Such potentially limitless
liability poses a greater deterrent to speech on public matters than is
permissible under the First Amendment. °° In addition, while the statutes
generally require that to sustain a disparagement claim the plaintiff must
produce "such products" as are disparaged, 10 the statutes provide no
guidance as to how the term "such products" should be construed. Thus,
liability in the hypothetical may not be limited to navel orange growers.
In one sense, a report about navel oranges is by definit:on also about
95. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 20-IOA-2 (1995) ("Any procucer of perishable
agricultural food products" has a cause of action for damages resulting from disparagement of "any
such perishable agricultural food product."). Most of the other statutes similarly require, before
recovery is permitted, that a plaintiff produce or have an interest in "such" fond product that has
been disparaged.
96. In the only reported case involving any agricultural disparagement statute, a Georgia appellate
court upheld dismissal, on the grounds that no justiciable controversy existed, of a declaratory
judgment suit brought by two environmental watchdog groups against the state. Action for a Clean
Env't v. State, 457 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 1012 (Sept. 5,
1995).
97. See supra note 89 for possible grounds, in addition to the absence of any "of and concerning"
requirement (discussed infra text accompanying notes 99-102), upon which the agricultural
disparagement statutes might be found unconstitutional.
98. See supra part I.A.
99. See supra notes 36-40, 69-72 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 36-40, 69-80 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 95.
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citrus fruit (albeit merely a type of citrus fruit as opposed to all citrus
fruit). It is possible to read the agricultural disparagement statutes as
permitting producers of citrus fruit in such a case to recover as well."0 2
The only new agricultural disparagement law to apply the same
constitutional limitations that apply to defamation is the Idaho statute. 3
Not only does the statute explicitly require that the disparaging statement
be "of and concerning the plaintiff's specific perishable agricultural food
product,"'" it defines the required level of specificity: "The disparaging
factual statement must be clearly directed at a particular plaintiffs
product. A factual statement regarding a generic group of products, as
opposed to a specific producer's product, shall not serve as the basis for a
cause of action."' 5 In barring generic disparagement claims in this
manner, this language constitutionally addresses the "of and concerning"
requirement.
Outside of Idaho, the question still remains: How specific must a
reference be in order to give rise to a constitutional disparagement claim?
If Auvil I and the new statutes incorrectly suggest that a statement about
"apples" is of and concerning all apples, at what point is a statement
sufficiently of and concerning a particular plaintiff's product?
IV. WHEN GENERIC DISPARAGEMENT CLAIMS MAY BE
CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Free Speech Versus a Special Vulnerability to Injury
These questions amount to asking when disparagement liability for a
general reference may be permitted without inhibiting discourse in a
constitutionally impermissible manner. Because generic products are
indistinguishable, real economic injury to their producers can result from
statements that do not identify the products with the level of specificity
102. Liability may extend to even more bizarre lengths in Alabama, which requires no direct
connection between the plaintiff and the type of product that is disparaged: "Any person who
produces, markets, or sells a perishable food product" who "suffers damage as a result of another
person's disparagement of perishable food products" has a cause of action. Ala. Code § 6-5-622
(Supp. 1994). Conceivably every injured farmer and food seller in the state could claim
disparagement from a report that referenced only navel oranges.
103. Idaho Code §§ 6-2001 to -2003 (Supp. 1995). The statute requires a strict "of and
concerning" showing and proof that the defendant acted with actual malice regarding the falsity of
the statement, bars punitive damages, places the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and limits liability
to false factual statements.
104. Idaho Code § 6-2002(l)(a).
105. Idaho Code § 6-2003(4).
Washington Law Review
needed to satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement in other contexts.
Under what circumstances, if any, should this enhanced susceptibility to
injury from general statements outweigh the constitutional basis for the
group libel principle--that is, assuring that speech on issues of public
concern is not deterred?
Conventional "of and concerning" analysis does not address this
generic disparagement problem. A defamatory statement is of and
concerning a plaintiff if the statement's recipient reasonably understands
that it refers to the plaintiff.' 6 In most non-generic disparagement claims,
this test can be easily adopted without regard for the distinction between
defamation and disparagement, and between a plaintiff personally and a
plaintiff's product. If a disparaging statement's recipient reasonably
understands the statement to refer to the plaintiff's product, it is of and
concerning the plaintiff's product. In generic disparagement claims,
however, the distinction between a plaintiff individually and that
plaintiffs product cannot be overlooked: Although a statement about
"Smith's apples" is of and concerning both Smith and her apples, it does
not follow that a statement about "apples," with no reference to any
individual or individual's product, is of and concerning Smith's apples.
Furthermore, whereas defamatory statements referring to large groups
generally are not of and concerning any individual,' 7 some generic
disparagement claims may present circumstances in which the group
libel rule does not bar a finding that a general statement is of and
concerning specific products. The remainder of this Comment will
consider a framework for identifying those circumstances.
B. Goals of a Generic Disparagement Framework
A framework for determining when a general statement is of and
concerning all types of a product must uphold constitutional principles
and protect the public's interest in valuable speech such as that
examining food safety. At the same time, it also should identify the
narrow circumstances in which generic disparagement claims are in
theory' 8 constitutionally permissible--that is, when the: potential for
chilling speech on matters of public concern is slight and the potential for
106. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
108. Even when such a claim is constitutional under the framework to be proposed here, a court
may nevertheless bar it. Just as the group libel rule has non-constitutional as well as constitutional
justifications, courts are free to decide as a matter of policy to bar broad dispangement claims. See
supra notes 35-40, 61-72 and accompanying text.
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widespread injury to all producers of a type of generic product is high.
Given the potentially innumerable parties and huge damages resulting
from generic disparagement claims, the framework should limit liability
to those egregious circumstances in which producers damaged by
deliberately false statements should not be denied a remedy simply
because "their product... has many producers instead of only a few.' 109
The framework proposed here does not seek to define precisely when
a statement is "too generic" to be of and concerning any individual
product. Rather, it describes the factors a court should consider in
deciding whether a relatively greater or lesser level of specificity is
required to satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement.
C. Determining the Specificity Needed to Satisfy the "Of and
Concerning" Requirement
A starting point for such a framework is the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' limitation on disparagement liability to cases in which the
defendant "intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to
interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or
should recognize that it is likely to do so.""' The question that must be
addressed in determining whether a general statement is of and
concerning a generic producer's product is: Whose interests must the
defendant intend to harm, and how directly must the statement identify
them?
One possible answer is that to be of and concerning each product in a
generic class of products, the defendant must identify or intend for his
statement to reflect directly on every product in the class; if the
defendant disparages "oranges" but has no particular orange grower "in
mind," his statements are not of and concerning any orange grower's
product."' At the other extreme, a generically disparaging statement
referring to no product in particular could be of and concerning the entire
class no matter what the defendant subjectively intends; it could simply
be held that the defendant should have known that by referring to a
109. Appellants' Reply Brief at 9, Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (No.
93-35963), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-1372).
110. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A (1977). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
11. A literal application of this could bear out the admonition in Auvil I that "potential
disparagors ... are home free if only they succeed in wreaking damage on a sufficient number of
manufacturers." Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F. Supp. 928,936 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
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product generically, the statement would injure each producer of that
product." 2
The goal of this framework-assuring public discourse is not deterred
while recognizing that generic producers can be vulnerable to general
statements-can be achieved without resorting to either of these polar
positions. To satisfy constitutional concerns, the "of and concerning"
requirement must be strictly construed in most instances, but a generic
disparagement claim may be permissible if certain conditions are met.
Courts should consider the following factors in determining the level of
specificity needed to satisfy the "of and concerning" element.
1. Distinguishing Allegedly Disparaged Products and Products
Referred to in the Statement
As a threshold requirement, a statement that identifies a particular
breed, brand, genus, or type of product should not be held to be of and
concerning some other classification of that product." 3 The more
removed a plaintiff's product is from the actual subject cf the allegedly
disparaging statement, the less likely it is the statement was intended to
harm the plaintiff or was objectively about the plaintiff. Applying this to
the hypothetical orange growers, if a statement refers only to navel
oranges, growers of other varieties of oranges or other foods should not
be able to sustain a disparagement claim, even if they suffered damages
as a result of the statement.
There are two reasons for this. The first is prudential: It is an axiom of
tort law that defendants are not necessarily liable for all damage
attributable to them. At some point logic, administrative efficiency, a
judicial sense of fair play, and other policy concerns combine to set some
limit, in the form of proximate causation, on the extent of liability."' The
second reason for using the "of and concerning" element to limit liability
in this manner is constitutional. Were journalists and other commentators
112. Most of the agricultural disparagement statutes take this approach, providing a cause of
action with no intent-to-harm element. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-113E(l) (Supp. 1995)
(requiring no intent to harm, merely intentional dissemination of information defendant "knows or
should have known to be false").
113. If the statement identifies a specific individual or product, it cannot logically be of and
concerning another individual even if the other is damaged. Yet under the new agricultural
disparagement laws, liability in such cases appears possible: "Joe Blow could sue [a] newspaper if it
ran a false story about Jane Blow's apples." Cohen, supra note 87, at 6A.
114. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.. 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 61-62, 97-98
(1956).
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to fear liability not only from their subjects but from any other party that
might come to be affected by their statements, few would risk speech on
any product at all." 5
2. Statements Targeting Treatment or Processing, Not the Product
Itself
A more specific reference should be required to satisfy the "of and
concerning" requirement when the allegedly disparaging statement
targets the way some of the products are processed than when the
statement is about the product itself. The statement "apples cause cancer"
is intuitively more of and concerning apples than is the statement "apples
treated with Alar cause cancer." When the product itself is disparaged,
individual producers can do nothing to separate their product from the
criticism. This is not so when the target is a method of treatment; a
producer could, for example, cease using the method in question or
advertise that its products are free of the criticized additive. Although the
harm resulting from criticism directed at a pervasive agricultural practice
sometimes may be, as a practical matter, just as severe as criticism
leveled at the product itself, the real target of such statements is still the
treatment and not the product. Furthermore, the public's interest in
assuring safe business practices and a safe food supply warrants the
highest level of protection for speech on issues involving manufacturing
and agricultural practices." 6
Applying this analysis to the hypothetical orange growers, the fact that
the false statement was about a procedure used to treat navel oranges
rather than about the fruit itself would be a factor supporting application
of a strict "of and concerning" requirement to any disparagement claim.
A broad, generic disparagement claim by navel orange growers-some
of whom may not even use the procedure in question-would probably
be barred. Suppose, however, the criticized procedure was the use of a
generic pesticide made by thirty producers. The fact that the pesticide
itself was implicated would, assuming the other elements of the tort were
met, weigh in support of a disparagement claim by all of the pesticide's
manufacturers.
115. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
116. See Arent, supra note 11, at 445 (arguing speech critical of products and businesses deserves
full First Amendment protection to "encourage investigation and exposure of product defects and
unethical business practices").
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3. Defendants Seeking a Competitive Advantage over Plaintiffs
Generally, commercial speech is thought to be "hardy" enough to
withstand the possible chilling effect of reduced First Amendment
protection." 7 Commercial speech is constitutionally protected, but in
some contexts to a lesser degree than non-commercial speech;" 8 for
example, the First Amendment does not protect misleading commercial
speech from government suppression." 9 The constitutional protection
that is afforded to commercial speech rests in some measure on the value
such speech has to the consuming public. 2 ' This value is reduced when
the speech is "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its
specific business audience,"'' or when a false claim about safety is
advertised "for the purpose of persuading members of the reading public
to buy the [advertiser's] product."'2 For these reasons, self-serving
disparaging statements made about a competitor should not receive the
highest level of First Amendment protection.'" A relatively less specific
reference constitutionally could satisfy the "of and concerning"
requirement when a defendant makes a disparaging statement to gain a
competitive advantage over the plaintiff.
117. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762--63 (1985); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 7,18, 771 n.24 (1976).
The commonly accepted definition of commercial speech is speech that does "n, more than propose
a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973). The precise distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech
strikes some as elusive. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who 's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76
Va. L. Rev 627, 638-48 (1990).
118. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-72.
119. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); cf.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990)
(holding that "the subordinate valuation of commercial speech is not confined to the government
regulation line of cases" but applies as well to defamatory commercial speech nvolving matters of
private concern). For criticism of this holding, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Sectior 43(a), Commercial
Falsehood, and the First Amendment: A Prop9sed Framework, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 309, 378-83
(1993).
120. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65; Langvardt, supra note 11, at 939 n.217.
121. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762.
122. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1977)
(upholding bar on false advertisements that stated "no scientific evidence" link-d egg consumption
with heart disease), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
123. See Langvardt, supra note !1, at 968-69 (arguing lesser degree of fault should be required to
prove disparagement when statement is made about competitor); Reinhard, suvra note 13, at 738
(arguing disparagement of rival's property merits no First Amendment protection). But see Arent,
supra note 11, at 474 (contending that basing level of First Amendment protection on parties' status
as competitors "would chill some valuable speech and diminish the effect of competition between
firms").
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Thus, a less specific reference to the grower-plaintiffs would tend to
satisfy the "of and concerning" element if the party disparaging the
safety of oranges was not a news reporter but rather a representative of
the apple industry whose intent was to convince consumers to switch
from oranges to apples.
4. Allegedly Disparaging Statements Addressing Matters of Public
Concern
The constitutional rationale for the group libel rule turns on protecting
speech on matters "in the public eye.' '124 Therefore, in applying this
rationale to generic disparagement claims, greater protection-in the
form of requiring a more strictly construed "of and concerning"
element-is warranted when the statement refers to matters of public
concern.
Some lower courts have stated that speech about products, such as
consumer reporting, is of sufficient public interest to warrant heightened
First Amendment protection."~ Unfortunately, the Supreme Court "has
failed to provide meaningful standards or other significant guidance" to
distinguish public concerns from private disputes. 2 6 One commentator
has attempted to provide such guidance, describing several
considerations that are particularly relevant to generically disparaging
statements. 1' According to this view, speech about products is more
likely to be of public concern if it "pertains to an essential of life" such
124. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900 (W.D. Mich.
1980), affd, 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1981). "It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection."' Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 758-59 (citations omitted).
125. See, e.g., Quantum Elecs. Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 881 F. Supp.
753, 764 (D.R.I. 1995) (" [B]y its nature, consumer reporting involves matters of particular interest
to the public."); Dairy Stores Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220, 239-40 (N.J. 1986)
(Garibaldi, J., concurring). But see Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d
417, 427 (NJ. 1995) (noting that consumer reporting on "local businesses that involve everyday
products or services" may not involve legitimate public interest), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 752 (1996).
126. Langvardt, supra note 1I, at 964. Whether speech relates to a matter of public concern "must
be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147-48 (1983). A credit report that had limited circulation and was "solely in the individual interest
of the speaker and its specific business audience" was not a matter of public concern. Greenmoss,
472 U.S. at 761-63. A celebrity divorce was also a private dispute. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 454 (1976). See also Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1330 (5th Cir. 1993)
(allegation that rail company appropriated another company's car design concerned a private matter),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1587 (1994); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 1990)
(broadcaster's statement that plaintiff's product "didn't work" addressed matter of public concern),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
127. Langvardt, supra note II, at 966--68. Langvardt describes seven factors in all.
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as food,'28 or "to a matter of public safety or public health."'29 The
determination further turns on the extent to which the public uses the
product. 3 A plaintiff also may riaake its product a matter of public
concern by advertising it extensively or inviting critical reviews.",
Under this "public concern" factor, for example, a disparagement
claim brought by a large group of orange growers would more likely be
permissible if based on a false statement that oranges have a shorter than
expected shelf life than if based on a false report that oranges are unsafe
to eat. The first statement is primarily of interest to those in the business
of selling the fruit and, therefore, is not as deserving of the protection
afforded matters of public concern. The latter concerns all consumers
and, therefore, merits requiring the plaintiffs to show the statement
referred more specifically to their oranges.
D. Scope of the Framework
It must be emphasized that these factors address only the relative level
of specificity necessary to satisfy the "of and concerning" element when
producers of generic products are economically injured by statements
that do not refer to their products directly. It would be incorrect, for
example, for a plaintiff claiming to be the specific, though unnamed,
target of a competitor's false advertisement to argue the "of and
concerning" requirement should be relaxed because the advertisement
was published to gain a competitive advantage. Nor could a defendant
assert his statement that "Jane uses DDT on her oranges" is not of and
concerning Jane's oranges because it addresses the way the fruit is
treated, not the oranges themselves.
What sort of group disparagement claim, therefore, might be
constitutionally permitted? Applying the framework here to the orange
hypothetical, all navel orange growers who sustain economic injury from
a false report might claim disparagement if: 1) the report referred to
navel oranges generally, as opposed to a particular brand or those grown
in a specific location; 2) the report concluded that something inherent in
all navel oranges, rather than the way some of them are processed,
128. Id. at 966.
129. Id. at 966-67. This factor requires "examination of the seriousness, likelihood, and
immediacy of the danger that would have been created if the defects had actually existed." Id. at 967.
See also Quantum Electronics, 881 F. Supp. at 764.
130. Langvardt, supra note 11, at 967.
131. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1980); Quantum
Electronics, 881 F. Supp. at 764-65.
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renders them unsafe to consume; 3) the false report's publisher was in
competition with the navel orange industry, perhaps a grower of another
variety of oranges; and 4) the report implicated the safety of the fruit, as
opposed to its economic viability or some other characteristic of lesser
public interest. If some but not all of these conditions were present, a
court would weigh each factor and determine whether finding that the
"of and concerning" requirement was satisfied with something less than a
direct, specific reference to the plaintiff's products was justified.
Admittedly, these are narrow, perhaps unlikely, circumstances, 32 but if
the traditional understanding of the "of and concerning" requirement is to
be expanded at all, the limits described here are appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
Producers of indistinguishable goods can be injured by non-specific,
disparaging statements about the type of good they produce. In finding
generic disparagement claims generally permissible, however, the Auvil I
decision and the recent agricultural disparagement laws threaten to
unconstitutionally deter discourse on matters of public concern and to
extend liability beyond traditionally recognized limits. The "of and
concerning" requirement and the group libel rule should be applied to bar
most disparagement actions for speech that does not specifically identify
a particular plaintiff s product.
The new disparagement statutes address economic protectionist
concerns that do not outweigh the constitutional interests in barring
broad generic disparagement claims. Only where the speech in question
poses a true risk of injury to all producers of a type of product, in a
manner that does not implicate constitutional concerns about deterring
important speech, may a generic disparagement claim be allowed. This
should occur only when some extreme circumstance justifies finding that
the "of and concerning" requirement is satisfied with a less specific
reference than is normally required.
132. Nevertheless, the framework proposed here is more generous in its treatment of generic
references than is the analogous area of trademark law. Generic terms are not entitled to any
trademark protection. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). See
also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1995) (providing for cancellation of trademark registration if mark has
become the generic name for the good); Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic
Words, 89 Yale L.J. 1323, 1323-27 (1980).

